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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

ADA JONES,
Case No. 960423-CA
Plaintiff-Appellee,
Oral Argument Priority 15

vs.
DAVID BALDWIN1 and GLORIA
BALDWIN,
Defendants-Appellants.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTION
This is an appeal from a final judgment in a civil action.
Jurisdiction was conferred on the Utah Supreme Court by Utah Code
Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j) (1996).

This court has pour-over jurisdiction

under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(k) (1996).
ISSUES PRESENTED
1.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion in ordering

specific performance of the parties' contract, where the contract
specified all essential terms? This issue is reviewed for abuse of
discretion.

Property Assistance Corp. v. Roberts, 768 P.2d 976,

979 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
2.
purchased

Is an option which provides that the property may be
for fair market value sufficiently

definite to be

*David Baldwin passed away subsequent to the filing of his
brief.

enforceable? The propriety of specific performance is reviewed for
abuse of discretion, id.

Inherent legal issues are reviewed for

correctness.
3.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion in ordering a

conveyance of water consistent with the parties course of dealing
and usage, even though it may technically violate water company
rules?

Review is for abuse of discretion.

Id.

RESPONSE TO APPELLANTS' STATEMENT OF ISSUES
Defendants7 statement of issues presented posits 13 issues
under three broad categories.

Defendants' argument contains 10

main points, which do not readily correlate to the claimed issues.
Some of the claimed issues are not supported by argument.

This

section attempts to make a correlation between the issues and the
argument, and to briefly respond to matters which require only a
brief response. Defendants' specific issues and points of argument
are listed below, with a reference to the point in this brief which
responds to each issue or argument.
Defendants' Issue A.l. [The lower Court erred by holding that
the contract was clear and unambiguous.]: This issue is addressed
in Point I.
Defendants' Issue A.2. [The lower Court erred in finding that
there

existed

defendants.]:

an enforceable

contract

between

plaintiff

and

This issue is addressed in Point I.

Defendants' Issue A.3. [The lower Court erred by reforming a
clear and unambiguous contract.]:
2

Although plaintiff

sought

reformation in her complaint (R. 461-64), neither the Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law (R. 702-15) nor the First Amended
Partial Judgment and Decree (R. 756-60) contains any language
purporting to reform the contracts.

Because the trial court did

not reform the contract, there is no issue to which plaintiff need
respond.
Defendants7 Issue A.4. [The lower court erred by ordering
specific performance for an ambiguous contract.]:

This issue is

addressed in Point I.
Defendants7 Issue A.5. [The lower Court erred in ordering a
sale which was in violation of existing water rights.]: This issue
is addressed in Point III.
Defendants7 Issue A.6. [The lower court erred in disposing of
Mrs. Baldwin7s rights in the property when Mrs. Baldwin was not a
party to the contract upon which the lower Court based
decision.]:

its

This issue is addressed in Point I.E.

Defendants7 Issue B.l. [The lower Court erred by denying
defendants7 motion for summary judgment.]:
does not specifically

Defendants7 argument

address this claimed

issue, but it is

implicit in sections A-G of the defendants7 Argument. The issue is
addressed in Point I.
Defendants7 Issue B.2. [The lower Court erred by reversing the
summary judgment previously granted to defendants.]:

The trial

court did not "reverse" its prior grant of summary judgment. Judge
David L. Mower orally granted defendants7 motion for summary

3

judgment following a hearing held December 20, 1994.

(R. 355-56.)

Following that hearing, and before any formal order was entered,
plaintiff moved for the disqualification of Judge Mower. (R. 36971.)

The motion was referred to Judge Louis Tervort for hearing

(see R. 412-23) and was granted following a hearing held February
16, 1995. (R. 411.)

The order implementing the disqualification

expressly vacated the prior oral grant of summary judgment. (R.
426-29.)

Judge Tibbs reconsidered defendants' summary judgment

motion, and denied it following a hearing held April 12, 1995. (R.
441, 445-59.)
Defendants
improper.

do

not

claim

that

the

disqualification

was

It followed from the grant of disqualification that

Judge Mower's ruling would be vacated.

Even if there had been no

disqualification, the trial court would still have been free to
reexamine and change the ruling on the summary judgment.

Utah R.

Civ. P. 54(b); Ron Shepherd Insurance. Inc. v. Shields. 882 P.2d
650, 654 (Utah 1994) ("it is settled law that a trial court is free
to reassess its decision at any point prior to entry of a final
order or judgment.") There was, therefore, no error in "reversing"
the summary judgment previously granted.
Defendants' Issue B.3. [The lower Court erred by entering
summary judgment in favor of plaintiff when plaintiff had not moved
for summary judgment.]:

The trial court did not grant summary

judgment in favor of plaintiff. (R. 445-59) . Even if the court had
done so, it would not have been procedurally improper.

4

Utah R.

Civ. P. 54(c) specifically provides that M[E]very final judgment
shall grant the relief to which the party in whose favor it is
rendered is entitled, even if the party has not demanded such
relief in his pleadings.'1

The application of this rule to allow

summary judgment against a moving party where no cross-motion was
filed is well established in cases under the analogous federal
rules.

See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 106 S. Ct. 2548 (1986);

Pueblo of Santa Ana v. Mountain States Tel., 734 F.2d 1402 (10th
Cir. 1986).
Issue C.l. [The lower Court erred by granting both a legal and
equitable remedy to plaintiff for the same alleged wrong.]:

This

issue is addressed in Point IV.
Issue C.2. [The lower Court erred

in refusing the jury

instructions and corrections to jury instructions requested by
defendants.]: To challenge a failure to give a jury instruction or
the giving of an incorrect instruction, a party must show the
proposed instruction is a correct statement of the law, that the
party was entitled to the instruction under the facts and theories
presented, that the subject was not adequately covered by other
instructions, and that the failure to give the instruction was
prejudicial.

Salt Lake City v. Smoot. 921 P.2d 1003, 1008 (Utah

Ct. App. 1996); Snyderville Transportation Co. v. Christiansen, 609
P.2d 939, 942 (Utah 1980) . The party must also show that the party
made a specific objection at trial:
The objection must be sufficiently specific to
give the trial court notice of the claimed
5

error in the instruction. An objection that
an instruction is not supported by, and is
contrary to the law lacks that degree of
specificity so as to direct the court's attention to a particular matter.
Redevelopment Agency of Salt Lake Citv v. Barrutia, 526 P.2d 47, 51
(Utah 1974).
Defendants have made no attempt to comply with these requirements.

The only argument addressed to this issue is the last

paragraph of Section J, on page 47 of defendants7 brief.

That

paragraph make a broad accusation of error,2 but gives absolutely
no

detail

or

substance.

Defendants'

objections

similarly lacking in any meaningful detail.
tr. 751 (R. 1085).)

below

were

(Tr. 675 (R. 1049);

This Court should refuse to consider the

issue.
Issue C.3. [The lower Court erred in refusing to give the jury
the special verdict interrogatories requested by defendants.]: As
with the prior claimed issue, defendants present no arguments in
support of this claim.

Defendants do not even give a record

citation to their proposed special verdict interrogatories nor
attach a copy to their brief, nor has plaintiff been able to

2

The claim that the trial court refused every jury instruction
requested by defendants is false. The trial court's Instructions
nos. 10 (R. 686), 18 (R. 695), and 20 (R. 697) are identical to
instructions requested by defendants (R. 618, 621, 620). Many of
defendants' other requested instructions were given in substance.
For example, defendants' first two requested instructions (R. 59596) were essentially identical, and were covered in substance in
the trial court's Instruction No. 1. (R. 680.)
6

discover a copy in the record.

This Court should refuse to

consider the issue.
Issue C.4. [The lower Court erred by refusing to accept offers
of proof by defendants.]: The trial court did refuse to accept 15
proffers by defendants, after having listened to at least 13
proffers and at least five side-bar conferences.

Defendants do

not, however, give a record citation to any of those incidents,
defendants do not cite any legal authority to show why the refusals
were error, nor do defendants show how they were prejudiced by the
refusals.

(The record supports the refusals.3)

3

This Court should

Much of the evidence defendants apparently wanted to present
would have consisted solely of defendants' interpretation or
understanding of the contracts. Although there must be a "meeting
of the minds" for a contract to exist, that concurrence of intent
is found not in the parties having thought the same thing, but in
their having said the same thing. Utah Valley Bank v. Tanner. 636
P.2d 1060, 1061 (Utah 1981) ("The basic rule of contract interpretation is that the intent of the parties is to be ascertained from
the content of the instrument itself . . . . " ) ; Jaramillo v.
Farmers Ins. Group. 669 P.2d 1231, 1233 (Utah 1993) ("unexpressed
intentions do not affect the validity of a contract"); Allen v.
Bissinaer & Co.. 62 Utah 226, 219 P. 539, 541-42 (1923) (The law
"judges of his intentions by his outward expressions and excludes
all questions in regard to his unexpressed intention. If his words
or acts, judged by a reasonable standard, manifest an intention to
agree to the matter in question, that agreement is established, and
it is immaterial what may be the real but unexpressed state of his
mind upon the subject.") (citation omitted); Kitzke v. Turnidae.
307 P. 2d 522, 527 (Or. 1957) ("The law of contracts is not
concerned with the parties' undisclosed intents and ideas. It
gives heed only to their communications and overt acts."); Hotel
Riviera. Inc. v. Torres. 632 P.2d 1155, 1157 (Nev. 1981) ("The
making of a contract depends not on the agreement of two minds in
one intention, but on the agreement of two sets of external signs,
—not on the parties' having meant the same thing but on their have
said the same thing.") (citation omitted, italics in original).
7

decline to consider the issue,4 Burns v. Summerhavs, 302 Utah Adv.
Rep. 48, 49 (Ct. App. Oct. 31, 1996).
Argument A. [The court cannot write the parties' contract for
them.]:

This is addressed in Point I.

Argument B. [A contract which is indefinite as to a material
term cannot be enforced.]:

This is addressed in Point I.

Argument C. [The agreement does not provide a means for fixing
the purchase price without the further expression of the parties. ]:
This is addressed in Point I.e.
Argument D. [The court cannot reform an agreement not made.]:
The court did not reform the agreement.

See discussion for Issue

A.3 above.
Argument E. [The parties [sic] agreement did not address the
matter of warranties, including particularly the warranty against
environmental hazards.]: This is addressed in Point I.A. and Point
II.
Argument F. [Plaintiff has admitted that the parties did not
reach agreement on the essential terms of purchase and that she
wants the court to supply those terms.]:
reformation which did not occur.

This challenges the

See discussion for Issue A. 3

defendants' brief is laden with unwarranted aspersions at
Judge Tibbs. Defendants do not, however, and could not, make any
claim that Judge Tibbs was prejudiced or biased. Many examples
could be given of trial rulings against the plaintiff. The trial
was conducted in a fair and even-handed manner, and Judge Tibbs
showed
remarkable
long-suffering
restraint
notwithstanding
contemptuous remarks by defendants' counsel. E.g., Tr. 539-40 (R.
1015).
8

above.

The court did properly hold that the law infers certain

provisions, as is explained in Points I, II, and III.
Argument G.

[The most basic and essential terms of the

proposed purchase were never agreed upon.]:

This is addressed in

Point I.
Argument H. [There is no agreement on the single nondivisible
water membership and the court cannot supply the same.]:

This is

addressed in Point III.
Argument I. [Impropriety of Summary Judgment.]:
summary judgment in favor of plaintiff.

There was no

See Issue B.3 above.

Argument J. [The trial below was procedurally defective.]:
See Issues C.l, C.2, C.3, and C.4 above.
Defendants have referred to many other evidentiary and other
issues, particularly in defendants' Summary of Argument and in
their statement of the Nature of the Case. These claims appear to
be mentioned primary to make a personal criticism of the trial
court. Defendants advance no arguments in support of these claims,
and plaintiff has not addressed those claims in this brief.

This

Court should summarily reject any claims raised by defendants which
are not supported by meaningful argument.

Burns, supra.

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES, RULES, ETC.
Plaintiff is not aware of any constitutional provisions,
statutes, or rules whose interpretation is determinative of the
issues raised on appeal.

9

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case.

This is an appeal from a final judgment in a civil action.
Plaintiff's complaint sought specific performance of an option to
purchase real property, and damages for the delay in receiving
specific performance.
B.

Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below.

Plaintiff filed her complaint August 2, 1993. (R. 1-6.)

The

initial complaint named only David Baldwin as the defendant.
Gloria Baldwin was named as a defendant in an amended complaint
filed November 12, 1993. (R. 19-31.)

Defendants answered and

counterclaimed for unlawful detainer.5 (R. 35-47.)
Defendants moved for summary judgment against plaintiff's
complaint on August 26, 1994. (R. 60-61.) Following briefing, the
court set the motion for oral argument. (R. 352-53.)

At the oral

arguments, the court (Judge David K. Mower) disclosed potentially
conflicting relationships he had with the defendants' attorney, but
proceeded with arguments on the summary judgment motion.

At the

conclusion of the hearing Judge Mower orally granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment. (R. 355-56.)

Soon after the

hearing, plaintiff moved for the disqualification of Judge Mower.
(R. 369-71.) Judge Mower disputed the sufficiency of the affidavit
5

The judgment on appeal does not formally dismiss the counterclaim, but does include a certification under Utah R. Civ. P. 54(b)
that the judgment is final. The issues in the counterclaim were
resolved by stipulation of the parties, but apparently no formal
order was entered.
10

of prejudice and referred the case for decision by another judge.
(R. 412-23.)

Judge Louis G. Tervort was assigned to decide the

disqualification motion and, following a hearing, granted the
motion. (R. 411.) The order of disqualification also provided that
the prior summary judgment was vacated. (R. 426-29.)
The case was assigned to Judge Don V. Tibbs, who scheduled new
arguments on the summary judgment motion.

Following arguments,

Judge Tibbs denied the motion for summary judgment. (R. 441, 44559.)
With
Complaint

leave
and

of

court,

plaintiff

Jury

Demand

on May

filed

5,

1995

a

Second

Amended

(R. 460-74) , and

defendants answered the amendment. (R. 488-90.) The case proceeded
to trial before a jury from November 27-30, 1995. (R. 668-78.)
At the conclusion of the evidence, the trial court made oral
findings on the equitable issues and held that plaintiff was
entitled to specific performance. (Tr. 661 (R. 1045).)

The court

submitted to the jury the issue of damages resulting from the delay
in specific performance. (Tr. 666 (R. 1047).)
damages of $8,000.00. (Tr. 746 (R. 1084).)

The jury awarded

The issue of attorney

fees was reserved for a subsequent hearing. (Tr. 462 (R. 996).)
A hearing on attorney fees was held January 22, 1996. (R. 74648.)

The trial

court

awarded

attorney

fees of $25,000.00,

approximately half the amount claimed. (Id.)

The First Amended

Partial Judgment and Decree was entered March 8, 1996, which
incorporated

all

prior

rulings

11

of

the

court

but

retained

jurisdiction

to enforce certain provisions

of the decree of

specific performance. (R. 756-60.) The decree included a provision
stating that it should be deemed final under Rule 54(b) of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure. (Id) J 10.
Defendants filed their notice of appeal on March 14, 1996. (R.
761.) Defendants sought and received an extension of time to file
a cross-appeal (R. 1103), and filed their notice of appeal on the
attorney fee issues on July 15, 1996. (R. 1105.)
C

Statement of Facts.

On June 6, 1984, Ada ("Billie") Jones and Marilyn ("Pondy")
Hansen executed a contract

(Exhibit 1) with David Baldwin and

Gloria Baldwin to lease the Baldwins' Phillips 66 service station
and the real property on which it stood. (Tr. 144-45 (R. 880).)
The service station had not been used for approximately ten years.
(Tr.

171-72

(R. 886-87).)

Hansen

and Jones

expended

about

$9,500.00 for improvements and spent two to three weeks cleaning,
remodeling, and painting the service station and opened it as the
Burr Trail Cafe.

(Tr. 360, 440 (R. 951, 971).)

The Baldwins lived on property adjoining the cafe.
(R. 884).)

(Tr. 163

The property on which Baldwins lived was titled in the

name of Howard and Ada Church, the parents of Gloria Baldwin. (Tr.
230 (R. 919).)

The former service station property, now a cafe,

was titled in Baldwins' names. (Tr. 144 (R. 880).)
Marilyn Hansen moved out of town later in 1984 because she was
getting divorced (Tr. 293 (R. 934)), and Ada Jones bought out her

12

interest. (Tr. 361 (R. 951).)

Baldwins and Jones modified their

1984 agreement at least twice by interlineation on the original
agreement. (Tr. 185 (R. 890).)

The modifications deleted Marilyn

Hansen as a party to the lease and changed the rental amount.
These changes to the contract were initialed by Ada Jones (and
Marilyn Hansen while she was still involved) and David Baldwin.
(Tr. 185-88 (R. 890-91).) Gloria Baldwin typically did not initial
the changes, but they were usually made in her presence and she
approved of the changes. (Tr. 149, 335-36, 363 (R. 881, 945, 952).)
In 1992, David Baldwin required that a new agreement be made.
(Tr. 150, 198-99 (R. 882, 911).)

The parties met in the home of

David and Gloria Baldwin and David Baldwin wrote, in longhand, a
new agreement. (Tr. 152 (R. 882).) Although Gloria Baldwin did not
sign the agreement, she was present during this process and voiced
no objection to the new agreement. (Tr. 338 (R. 946).)
The 1992 agreement granted Jones an option to purchase in the
following language:
3.
At any time during this agreement the
grantee may have the first right of refusal to
purchase said property.
a.
The purchase price shall be fixed,
at that time, at a fair market value, as
established by the opinions of three (3)
independent appraisers to be selected by
mutual agreement of the parties hereto.
b.
The remaining terms of such purchase
shall be established at that time by mutual
agreement of the parties hereto.
Exhibit 2.
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Baldwins claimed at trial that this provision provided for a
first right of refusal rather than an option.

Jones presented

evidence, however, that Mr. Baldwin had spoken of the provision as
an option. (Tr. 249, 423-24, 436-37 (R. 923, 967, 970).)
The original agreement included a provision that one-half of
Jones's rent payments would be applied as a down payment if Jones
exercised her option to purchase. (Exhibit 1, J 3.B.)
agreement

did not expressly

include this equity

The new

accumulation

provision, but Mr. Baldwin told Ms. Jones she would still get her
equity under the new agreement. (Tr. 368 (R. 953).)

On August 1,

1993, Mr. Baldwin told Ms. Jones her equity was $15,036.00.
(Exhibit 6, tr. 373-74 (R. 954-55).)

The trial court found that

the 1992 agreement was an extension or modification of the 1984
agreement and that the terms of the prior agreement

carried

forward, and that Ms. Jones was therefore entitled to apply her
equity credit against the purchase price of the property. (R. 706
5 7.)
Jones wanted to exercise her option to purchase the property,
and asked David Baldwin on several occasions for a price. She also
asked him to have the property appraised pursuant to the agreement.
(Tr. 371, 418 (R. 954, 966).)

He responded, in the later part of

December, 1992, that "it didn't matter what the appraisal, he'd
sell it for what he wanted." (Tr. 418 (R. 966).)
Jones ultimately sought the assistance of an attorney, and
with his help, submitted a written tender, pursuant to Utah Code
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Ann. S 78-27-1, offering to pay "the purchase price of the premises
as may be established by three independent appraisers." (Exhibit 3,
tr. 372 (R. 954).)

In the document of tender, Jones stated her

willingness to cooperate in the selection of appraisers, and
alternatively

stated her willingness to pay $40,000.00 as an

alternative to the appraised value.

Jones present evidence that

the fair market value of the property at the time Jones tendered
performance was less than $39,000.00.

(Tr. 285 (R. 932).)

Ms.

Jones had the ability at the time of the tender to pay the
$40,000.00. (Tr. 415, 438 (R. 965, 971).)
Baldwin did not respond to the tender for a month, and then
his response was to simply refuse to sell and to purport to
withdraw any offer to sell.

(Exhibit

5, tr. 372

(R. 954).)

Plaintiff then commenced this lawsuit seeking specific performance
of the contract.
The cafe property and Baldwins' adjoining residence were
serviced by a single commercial water connection from Boulder
Farmstead Water Company. The water meter was on the cafe property.
(Tr. 426 (R. 968).)

The cafe property was the only real property

in Baldwins' name until two weeks prior to trial, at which time the
home property was also transferred into Baldwins' name.

The

president of the Boulder Farmstead Water Company testified that the
company was not selling additional water shares and did not
currently permit the division of water shares, but that the company
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recognized that it would be required to make provision for such a
division. (Tr. 507-09 (R. 1007).)
Two underground storage tanks remaining from the service
station operations remained on the property. (Tr. 588 (R. 1027).)
The Baldwins had not complied with the applicable registration
requirements of the Utah State Department of Environmental Quality.
(Exhibits 10, 12; tr 598-99 (R. 1030).)
The

Burr

Trail

Cafe

enjoyed

a

reputation

for

quality.

Customers were pleased with the size of the servings and the
quality of the food.

(Tr. 247, 300-01 (R. 923, 936).)

Jones was

evicted from the cafe during the pendency of the lawsuit, following
the 1994 summer tourist season. (Tr. 379 (R. 956).)

Baldwins

thereafter undertook to operate the cafe, but did not enjoy the
same reputation.

Customers complained that the portions were

smaller, the service poor, and the food not as tasty. (Tr. 249,
301-02 (R. 923, 936-37).)

The drop in quality provided an opening

for other restaurants to move into town and capture some of the
business formerly enjoyed by the Burr Trail Cafe. (Tr. 249, 624-25
(R. 923, 1036).) For example, Mark Austin, the co-owner of the 20room Boulder Mountain Lodge (tr. 237, 257 (R. 920, 925)), had
referred perhaps several hundred customers to Jones's restaurant.
(Tr. 256 (R. 925).)

After Baldwins took over the restaurant,

Austin determined he needed to build his own restaurant because the
quality of the Baldwin restaurant was unacceptable.
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(Tr. 249 (R.

923).)

Austin's restaurant was scheduled to be completed by

Christmas 1995.

(Tr. 256 (R. 925).)

Jones's damages from being evicted from the cafe included
$20,258.60 in lost profits from the cafe, and $4,200.00 in lost
rental income she could have obtained from her house in Salt Lake
City, to which she had to move after being evicted from the cafe.
(Ex. 19, tr. 384-85 (R. 957).)

She testified her net damage,

including her lost equity, was $32,491.65.

(Id.)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The parties entered into a valid lease which granted plaintiff
an option to purchase.

Although labeled as a right of first

refusal, the contract language was consistent only with an option.
Other evidence confirmed that the parties intended an option, and
rendered the contract sufficiently definite for specific performance.

The contract and the evidence thus fully supported the

trial court's decree ordering specific performance of the option.
The option implicitly required defendants to convey marketable
title.

The decree's requirement that defendants comply with

environmental laws by removing gasoline storage tanks was necessary
to make the title marketable.
A water connection had been part of the leased property for
the entire term of the lease, and the connection was located on the
leased property. Although the water company did not currently have
a procedure for splitting a water share, the company president
acknowledged that the company would be required to develop such a
17

procedure. The trial court therefore did not abuse its discretion
in ordering the parties to continue their present practice of
splitting the single water share.
Plaintiff

suffered

specific performance.

damages
The

from

the

delay

law allows damages

in

receiving

for delay

in

receiving an equitable remedy. The award of damages was therefore
proper.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS
DISCRETION IN ORDERING SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE.
A.

Introduction and standard of review.

The defendants' primary argument on appeal appears to be that
the contract was indefinite and therefore not susceptible to
specific performance. Defendants base this argument on dictum from
Pitcher v. Lauritzen. 18 Utah 2d 368, 423 P.2d 491 (1967). Pitcher
cites 49 Am. Jur. Specific Performance § 22, now found at 71 Am.
Jur. 2d Specific Performance § 30 (1973) . Section 31 of that work
states:
In the law of contracts, the mere fact
that a sufficiently exact meaning of the terms
of a contract can be ascertained only by
considering admissible evidence of extrinsic
facts does not render the agreement invalid
for indefiniteness; it is sufficient if it can
be made certain by proof.
And although a
greater degree of certainty may be required by
the court before it will grant a decree of
specific performance than would be required in
an action at law for damages for breach of the
18

contract, a contract is considered to be
sufficiently definite and certain to be
specifically enforceable if it contains
provisions which are capable in themselves of
being reduced to certainty or of being made
certain by the aid of legal presumptions or
evidence of established customs, and from
which the intention of the parties can be
clearly ascertained. . . .
Accord

Property Assistance Corp. v. Roberts. 768 P. 2d 976, 978

(Utah Ct. App. 1989) (affirmed specific performance of option
contract where the trial court received parol evidence to resolve
an ambiguity,

and thereby

rendered

the agreement

"clear and

enforceable").
The hand-written contract at issue, drafted by David Baldwin,
was enforceable. On issues where Mr. Baldwin had failed to include
sufficient detail, the trial court was able to supply the necessary
detail by resort to legal presumptions, established customs, other
rules of law, and evidence of the conduct of the parties.

This

evidence fully supports the trial courts order.
Specific performance is an equitable remedy, and "may not be
upset on appeal in the absence of an abuse of discretion."

Id. at

979 (citing Morris v. Svkes, 624 P.2d 681, 684 (Utah 1981)). Where
the trial court makes factual findings based on extrinsic evidence,
those findings and the resulting judgment will not be reversed
unless clearly erroneous.

Id., 768 P.2d at 978 (citing Utah R.

Civ. P. 52(a)).
Defendants do not specifically challenge any of the trial
court's factual findings.

A challenge to the findings of fact
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would require that the defendants first specifically identify the
finding which they challenge.

Defendants would then have been

required to marshal the evidence relating to that finding, to show
the finding was not supported by competent evidence.
Bvrns, 911 P.2d 981, 988 (Utah Ct. App. 1995).

State v.

Defendants have

made no effort to challenge any factual findings in this manner.
This Court must therefore presume that each of the trial court's
findings was supported by the evidence.

Id.

The only remaining

issues, therefore, are whether any legal decisions made by the
trial court were correct, and whether the trial court abused its
discretion in ordering specific performance.
B.

The contract granted plaintiff an option.

The meaning of a contract should first be determined from the
four corners of the contract itself. Courts then look to extrinsic
evidence, with preference to documents which were part of the same
transaction. Finally, resort is had to the rule that documents are
construed against the drafter. Plateau Mining Co. v. Utah Division
of State Lands and Forestry. 802 P.2d 720, 725 (Utah 1990); Krauss
v. Utah State Department of Transportation. 852 P.2d 1014, 1019
(Utah Ct. App. 1993) ; Continental Bank and Trust Co. v. Bybee, 6
Utah 2d 98, 306 P.2d
principles

fully

773, 775

supports

the

(1957).
trial

Application of these
court's

findings

and

conclusions.
The agreement

itself admits

of only

one

interpretation.

Paragraph 3 of the 1992 contract stated "the grantee may have the
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first right of refusal to purchase said property," yet provided a
mechanism for fixing the purchase price in the event plaintiff
exercised that right. This Court should look at the nature of the
right conferred, rather than the label. Property Assistance Corp.
v. Roberts, 768 P.2d 976, 978

(Utah Ct. App. 1989)

(holding

"option" contract was really a non-optional contract of sale);
G.G.A.. Inc. v. Leventis. 773 P.2d 841, 846 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)
(finding the word "option" actually meant right of first refusal);
Cumminas v. Nielson, 42 Utah 157, 129 P. 619, 621 (1913) (finding
the word "option" to actually denote a right of first refusal). If
a right of first refusal were intended, there would be no need to
specify a mechanism to determine the price.

The price would have

already been determined by the offer which triggered the right of
first refusal.

By specifying a mechanism to determine the price,

the parties evidenced an intent only consistent with an option.
The extrinsic evidence supports this interpretation. The 1984
contract, which the trial court held was part of the same transaction, expressly granted an option. Testimony of witnesses showed
that Mr. Baldwin had referred to the right under the 1992 contract
as an option.

Finally, the provision was drafted by Mr. Baldwin

and any remaining ambiguity should be construed against him.
C.

The price was sufficiently definite.

The agreement provided that plaintiff could purchase the
property at fair market value.

"[A]n agreement which sets a price

that is determined by factors outside the contract, such as a
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market price or the price in another contract, is valid and
enforceable."

Plateau Mining Co, v. Utah Division of State Lands

and Forestry, 802 P.2d 720, 726 (Utah 1990). Defendants challenged
the agreement in this case because the agreement also stated that
the fair market value was to be "established by the opinions of
three

(3)

independent

appraisers,

to

be

selected

by

mutual

agreement of the parties hereto." Defendants claim this created a
requirement

of further agreement between the parties and was

therefore not specifically enforceable, citing Cottonwood Mall Co.
v. Sine, 767 P.2d 499, 502 (Utah 1988).

This claim must be

evaluated, however, in the light of defendants' own obligation of
good faith and in light of the relative importance of this term to
the overall transaction.
All terms in a contract are not of equal importance:
There is no principle of equity that demands
all the terms of the contract must be set
forth in the written agreement.
Rather,
although an agreement
is uncertain or
incomplete in some respects, its specific
enforcement may nevertheless be decreed where
the uncertainty relates to matters which the
law makes certain or complete by presumption,
rule or custom and usage.
Reed v. Alvev. 610 P.2d 1374, 1378 (Utah 1980).

Although price is

a critical term, the mechanism for determining the price is not so
important.

This is illustrated in Marder's Nurseries, Inc. v.

Hopping, 573 N.Y.S.2d 990 (App. Div. 1991).

The contract in that

case provided that the purchase price was to be set by two
appraisers, and provided that if those appraisers could not agree,
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they should select a third appraiser, with the price to be fixed by
the decision of any two such appraisers. 573 N.Y.S.2d at 992. The
defendant argued this provision was too vague for enforcement. The
appellate court agreed:
The method designed by the parties, moreover,
is seriously flawed, since there is no
guarantee that the first two appraisers would
agree, or that, in the event of their
disagreement, they would be able to agree as
to the identity of the third appraiser.
Further, there is no guarantee that the third
appraiser, if he or she agreed to the
appointment, would concur with either one of
the original two.
573 N.Y.S.2d at 995. The court nonetheless held the agreement was
specifically enforceable.

The court noted that, while certainty

was necessary for enforcement,

"this doctrine has never been

applied *with a heavy hand.7"

573 N.Y.S.2d at 993 (citations

omitted).

The court stated:

"Absolute certainty has never been

required.

Instead, reasonable certainty has always been viewed as

sufficient to avoid the xlast resort' of canceling an otherwise
valid contract."

Id.6

The court concluded:

6

This statement is consistent with the rule in Utah, which was
stated in Kier v. Condrack, 25 Utah 2d 139, 478 P. 2d 327, 330
(1970), as follows:
We recognize the validity of the rule
relied upon by the defendants that to be
enforceable a contract must be sufficiently
definite in its terms that the parties know
what is required of them. But like all rules,
which are necessarily stated in generality, it
is only applicable in the proper circumstances, where the justice of the case
requires: as a shield to protect a party from
an injustice, and not as a weapon with which
to perpetrate an injustice.
23

In the present case, the parties agreed
to a purchase price that would reflect the
"fair market value" of the property. . . .
That the procedure by which the "fair market
value" is to be determined lends itself to
stalemate is not a fatal defect since . . . a
court may break any stalemate by determining
fair market value itself.
573 N.Y.S.2d at 995

(citations omitted).

Martina. 562 N.Y.S.2d 895, aff'd

Accord

Tonkery v.

577 N.E.2d 1024 (N.Y. 1991).

In addition, the contract must be read in light of the
parties7 duty of good faith and fair dealing.

Defendants had an

obligation to act in good faith. In Tanner v. Baadscraard, 612 P.2d
345 (Utah 1980) , a case where the parties had agreed to a sale and
an increase in the interest rate, but had not agreed to what
interest rate was to be used, the Court found that the parties had
a duty of good faith to make an effort to cooperate pursuant to the
agreement.

The Court stated:

When parties have entered into a formal contract, such as
for the purchase of real property, it is to be assumed
that they will cooperate with each other in good faith
for its performance, and one refusing to so perform, or
claiming a forfeiture thereof, has the burden of showing
justification for doing so.
612 P.2d at 347.
David Baldwin did not assert that he could not agree on
appraisers, nor did he state which three appraisers he would
accept.

He merely withdrew his offer for sale of the property.

Plaintiff's tender stated her willingness to work with Mr. Baldwin
in selecting appraisers.

It is likely that plaintiff would have

agreed to any three appraisers Mr. Baldwin chose.
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It was not the

lack

of

agreement

concerning

appraisers

which

defeated

the

contract, but Mr. Baldwin's denial that any contract existed.
D.

The description of the property is sufficiently definite
for enforcement.

The trial court found that "[w]hile no legal description was
set forth in Exhibit 1, the premises were easily demarcated and the
parties all understood the boundaries of the premises." Defendants
do not claim this finding lacks evidentiary support; in fact,
plaintiff is not aware of any contrary evidence. Defendants argue,
however,

that

the

lack of a legal description

agreement unenforceable.

rendered

the

This argument lacks merit.

The description of the property is sufficient under Utah law
for the sale of the property by contract.
P.2d 1374, 1377 (Utah 1980),

In Reed v. Alvey, 610

the written agreement described the

subject property as "corner of Hillview and Ninth East." The Court
in Reed stated:
In reviewing the written agreement evidencing the
contract, and any ambiguity inherent in the language
used, extrinsic evidence may be considered by the court
to delineate the intent of the parties and the enforceability of the contract. Thus, courts are provided a
means by which they can look beyond the terms found in
the written agreement to ascertain the intent of the
contracting parties. If from this examination of the
transaction the courts determine the actual contract is
certain and the obligation and rights of the parties
defined, then they may employ their equitable powers to
enforce the contract via specific performance.
Id. (emphasis added).
In the contract before this Court, the language reads, "the
grantor hereby grants the use of to grantee certain restaurant (or
25

cafe) and motel (or gift shop) property located in Boulder Utah,
Garfield County, State of Utah."
vagueness

because

there

Defendants assert that there is

is a residential

property

owned

by

defendants adjacent to the cafe property. However, by the parties'
own conduct, it is clear the parties did not intend the Agreement
to cover the residential property. Plaintiff was never associated
with the use of the residential property. In addition, at the time
of the agreement,

the residential

property

was

not

even in

defendants' names, but was titled in the names of Howard and Ida
Church.
In Hackford v. Snow. 657 P.2d 1271, 1276 (Utah 1982), the
Court stated:
Appellants also claim that the agreement . . . did not
describe the subject property with sufficient certainty
as to justify specific performance. . . . In the instant
case, the property was described as *Neola, (420 acre
Hackford Farm), Uintah County, State of Utah." Although
not precise, the description is sufficient to admit
extrinsic evidence to aid in determining the parties'
intentions, particularly in view of the trial court's
finding of part performance.
The

Hackford

description

situation before the Court.

is virtually
There

specificity of the two descriptions.

identical

is no difference

to

the

in the

There is enough information

that, with extrinsic evidence, the agreement can be made definite.
See also Colman v. Butkovich, 556 P.2d 503 (Utah 1976) (holding
that extrinsic evidence could come in to explain "PC" as Park City
and that description was not indefinite); Park West Village, Inc.
v. Avise, 714 P.2d 1137 (Utah 1986) (a description of "residence
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106 Pacific Avenue, aka 106 Lumbar Yard.M was sufficient enough to
enforce

an option to purchase the property

even though the

description was not accurate).
Clearly, the parties have had no difficulty determining which
property was to be leased since 1984, the first lease agreement.
In Eliason v. Watts. 615 P.2d 427, 430 (Utah 1980), the Court
relied on the rule of law that

,n

In equity, that is certain which

can be made certain'" and found the intent of the parties in the
case was ascertained through the doctrine of part performance. The
Court further went on to find that such evidence was sufficient to
enforce the agreement.

There is no issue as to which property was

the subject of the option to purchase in this agreement.
E.

The lack of Gloria Baldwin's signature does not affect
the validity of the agreement.

The trial court found that David Baldwin acted as Gloria
Baldwin's agent in signing the agreement, and that Gloria Baldwin
ratified the agreement by her conduct.

She was present when the

agreement was drafted and signed, and never voiced any objection to
it.

The issue of whether the trial court properly held Gloria

Baldwin estopped from now contesting the agreement is reviewed for
abuse of discretion.

Trolley Square Assocs. v. Nielson, 886 P.2d

61, 65 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).

Defendants do not claim any insuffi-

ciency of the evidence to support this finding, and it should be
affirmed.
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In addition, the lack of Gloria Baldwin's signature does not
affect David Baldwin's duty to honor the contract.

David Baldwin

was not required to have title until the time came for performance.
Corporation Nine v. Taylor. 30 Utah 2d 57, 513 P.2d 417, 412
(1973) .

Defendants did not allege nor prove that it would have

been impossible for him to honor his contract.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ORDERED COMPLIANCE WITH
ENVIRONMENTAL REQUIREMENTS.
Defendants7 obligation to convey title must be construed to
mean and refer to clear and marketable title, free of all liens and
encumbrances.

77 Am. Jur. 2d Vendor and Purchaser § 123 (1975) ;

Hall v. Fitzgerald, 671 P.2d 224, 227 (Utah 1983).

Marketable or

merchantable title is that quality of title which a reasonably
prudent man familiar with the facts would accept in the ordinary
course of business.

It must be free from liens and encumbrances,

free from reasonable doubt as to its validity, and free from the
hazard of present or potential litigation.

Hedaecock v. Stewart

Title Guaranty Co., 676 P.2d 1208, 1210 (Colo. Ct. App. 1983);
Darby v. Keeran. 211 Kan. 133, 505 P.2d 710, 715 (1973).

An

adverse claim to the property may render the title unmarketable,
even if the adverse claim is not actively asserted.

Paramount

Properties Co. v. Transamerica Title Insurance Co., 1 Cal. 3d 562,
463 P.2d 746, 749, 83 Cal. Rptr. 394 (1970); Michaelson v. Tieman.
36 Colo. App. 435, 541 P.2d 91 (1975).
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The presence of the underground storage tanks clearly made
title unmarketable.

Defendants did not dispute that.

Utah Code

Ann. S 19-6-402(24) (Supp. 1996) defines an owner of property
containing an underground storage tank as a "responsible party" for
purposes of the Underground Storage Tank Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 196-401 to -427, which act imposes significant duties and potential
liabilities on responsible parties.
The obligation to remove the underground storage tanks and
ensure compliance with environmental regulations was simply an
extension of the implied requirement of marketable title. Although
not specified

in the contract, the contractual obligation is

rendered certain by the aid of legal presumptions. 71 Am. Jur. 2d
Specific Performance § 30 (1973).

The trial court did not abuse

its discretion in ordering removal of the storage tanks.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY GRANTED PLAINTIFF
THE RIGHT TO MAINTAIN THE EXISTING WATER CONNECTION.
Utah Code Ann. § 73-1-11 states:
A right to the use of water appurtenant to
land shall pass to the grantee of such land,
and, in cases where such right has been
exercised in irrigating different parcels of
land at different times, such right shall pass
to the grantee of any parcel of land on which
such right was exercised next preceding the
time of the execution of any conveyance
thereof; subject, however, in all cases to
payment by the grantee in any such conveyance
of all amounts unpaid on any assessment then
due upon any such right; provided that any
such right to the use of water, or any part
thereof, may be reserved by the grantor in any
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such conveyance by making such reservation in
express terms in such conveyance, or it may be
separately conveyed.
The trial court specifically found that the water right was
appurtenant to the cafe property.

The facts supported that

finding, and defendants have not claimed otherwise. The president
of

the

water

company

testified

he

believed

the

water

was

appurtenant. Plaintiff testified she had always paid for the water
for the cafe and for defendants' home.

The water was initially

attached to the motel which is on the cafe property.

This Court

should affirm the finding that the water was appurtenant.
Defendants now claim that the water share cannot be divided,
and that compliance with the court's decree would leave defendants'
without water.

This claim has no substance.

Although the water

company does not currently have a mechanism to divide the water
share, the water company president acknowledged that the company
would have to devise such a mechanism.

Plaintiff was only awarded

one-half of the water share, so there is no risk of defendants
being deprived of water.
POINT IV
PLAINTIFF WAS ENTITLED TO DAMAGES FOR THE
DELAY IN SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE.
Defendants claim the trial court erred by awarding plaintiff
both a legal and equitable remedy.

This is not so.

The damages

awarded were for the delay in receiving the equitable remedy. Such
damage awards are well-supported under Utah law.

30

The Utah Supreme Court has stated, Mthe doctrine of election
of remedies is a technical rule of procedure and its purpose is not
to prevent recourse to any remedy, but to prevent double redress
for a single wrong." Anaelos v. First Interstate Bank of Utah. 678
P. 2d 772, 778
Gibralter

(Utah

Financial

1983)

Corp..

(quoting Royal Resources
603

P.2d

793,

796

(Utah

Inc. v.
1979)).

Further, Utah courts have consistently held that where there is
delay in providing specific performance, damages may be awardable.
LHIW. Inc. v. DeLorean. 753 P.2d 961, 964

(Utah 1988)

("any

disadvantage inhering to LHIW from the delay between July (the
expected closing date) and December

(the court-ordered closing

date) could have been recovered by an award of damages."); Bevan v.
J.H. Constr. Co., Inc.. 669 P.2d 442 (Utah 1983) (finding damages
for delay in closing on home); Wagner v. Anderson. 122 Utah 403,
250 P.2d 577, 580 (1952) ("Assuming that the respondent's refusal
to perform on time was wrongful, there arose in favor of the appellants a cause of action for specific performance and also

any

special

damages occasioned

can

prove."

(emphasis in original)) (citing to 49 Am. Jur. 198, and the

by the delay which the appellants

annotation at 95 A.L.R. 228 "to the effect that when decreeing
specific performance, a court of equity may award damages also to
the plaintiff if the decree of specific performance will not give
complete relief.").
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Defendants do not contest the amount of damages awarded, and
the award was amply supported by the evidence.

The damage award

should be affirmed.
POINT V
PLAINTIFF SHOULD BE AWARDED HER ATTORNEY FEES
INCURRED ON APPEAL.
The parties' contract provided for an award of attorney fees
in any action to enforce the contract.

Plaintiff was awarded

attorney fees below, and this Court should direct that she be
awarded her attorney fees incurred on appeal. Management Services
Corp. v. Development Associates. 617 P.2d 406, 409 (Utah 1980).
CONCLUSION
Defendants' appeal challenges only the trial court's legal
rulings.

Defendants have not claimed any of the factual rulings

were in error, nor made any attempt to marshal the evidence against
any factual findings.
court's

decree

All factual premises underlying the trial

must, therefore, be deemed

supported

by

the

evidence.
The trial court's legal rulings flow from and are compelled by
the factual findings. The contract was sufficiently definite to be
specifically enforced, and it granted plaintiff an option to
purchase.

The court's rulings on the gasoline storage tanks and

water rights were consistent with the contract and the requirement
to convey marketable title.
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The judgment and decree of the trial court should be affirmed
in all respects, and this case should be remanded with instructions
to award plaintiff a reasonable attorney fee on appeal.
DATED this

3^^

day of December, 1996.
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